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SCHEMATA AND ASSOCIATIVE PROCESSES IN PRAGMATICS
MARCO MAZZONE
Abstract:
The notion of schema has been given a major role by Recanati within his conception
of primary pragmatic processes, that is, associative processes presumed to deliver the
explicit content of utterances. I propose that schemata are just a manifestation of our
basic ability to create motivated associations on the basis of environmental regularities
we detect. In this perspective, associative relations have enough structure to license
inferential  effects  without  any appeal  to  genuine inferential  processes.  Associative
processes are then able to explain a number of pragmatic and linguistic phenomena
which have been thought instead to require specialized inferential processes.
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0. Introduction
Within the general issue of how far we can go in explaining pragmatic phenomena by way of
associative processes (Recanati  2004; Mazzone 2009) an important  topic  is the possible role of
schemata.1 Recanati (2004) has devoted a couple of insightful pages to this topic, in particular, to
how schemata could drive the search for coherence between activated representations. My present
aim is to extend that analysis in two ways.
In the first place, I intend to show that Recanati's considerations on schemata support a strong
argument in favor of associative versus inferential explanations in pragmatics. In Recanati's view,
certain pragmatic phenomena can be explained in terms of associative processes, and therefore they
do not require the kind of inferential reasoning that from Grice on has been considered the hallmark
of pragmatic processing. On the contrary, Relevance Theory (from now on, RT; Sperber and Wilson
1986/1995;  Wilson  and  Sperber  2004;  Carston  2002)  makes  the  assumption  that  pragmatic
processes  are  inferential  across  the  board;  in  practice,  utterance  interpretation  is  thought  to  be
obtained  through  a  non-demonstrative  inference  process  taking  a  set  of  premises  as  input  and
yielding  a  set  of  conclusions  as  output.  However,  the  main  argument  offered  by  RT against
associative  approaches  fails  to  take  in  the  due  consideration  the  way in  which  schemata  may
1 In general terms, associative processes are processes based on associations between representations – an idea which
has  been  central  in  the  philosophy  of  British  Empiricism  and  has  gained  new  impetus  from  psychology,
neuroscience and artificial intelligence in the last  half century (for a brief overview, see Fuster 2003, 6-10). In
particular,  Recanati  (2004)  makes specific  reference  to  processes  based on the  spreading  of  activation through
networks of associatively related representations.
As for schemata, the notion in its modern sense has been introduced by Bartlett (1932), and made famous by Neisser
(1967). Together with partial synonyms such as “frame” and “script”, the term “schema” refers to structured patterns
of information stored in memory. As we will see, Recanati (2004) makes use of the notion in order to explain how
associative processes might be constrained by a search for coherence in interpretation.
constrain and drive these processes. In point of fact, relevance theorists acknowledge a role both to
associative processes and to schemata. But this role cannot but be peripheral, to the extent that RT
conceives of associative relationships as unmotivated and based on mere statistical co-occurrence;
as a consequence, RT assigns the power to reach a motivated interpretation exclusively to inferential
processing. Recanati has shown, instead, that associative processes can be constrained by schemata
so as to deliver motivated interpretations. More radically, as I will argue by generalizing the notion
of schema, it can be doubted that associative relationships are unmotivated at all. On the contrary,
they have enough structure in themselves to license – without any appeal to an inferential mode of
processing – the inferential effects which are made explicit in traditional pragmatic reconstructions.
This is probably what Recanati intends when he incidentally claims that associative processes may
well mimick inferential processes (see below). Not only do these considerations show that RT's
argument  against  associative  explanations  is  flawed,  insofar  as  associative  accounts  have  the
resources  to  explain  certain  pragmatic  phenomena;  they  also  pose  a  problem  for  inferential
accounts, since it is not clear why one should make appeal to genuine inferences in comprehension
once it is realized that associative processes – that is, the best established cognitive mechanism in
psycholinguistics in particular and cognitive science in general – do account for inferential effects.
There is a second sense in which I propose to extend Recanati's analysis of the role of schemata
in associative processing. Schemata, I will claim, may also play a key role with reference to other
phenomena  than  the  ones  Recanati  refers  to;  in  particular,  schemata  may  contribute  to  the
explanation of both other pragmatic phenomena – such as the consideration of the speaker's beliefs
– and other levels of linguistic processing besides pragmatics. This claim is closely related to our
previous considerations: since the dynamics of associative activation is but the other side of the
general  cognitive  ability  to  detect  and  store  regularities  of  any  kind,  we  may  expect  that  our
considerations about schemata generalizes to any domain of experience. However, by this claim I
part  company  with  Recanati  (2004).  In  his  view,  associative  processes  apply  only  to  specific
pragmatic  phenomena  at  the  lexical  level,  while  the  most  traditional  Gricean  phenomena  –
including consideration of the speaker's beliefs – would require proper inferential processing.2 On
the  contrary,  I  see  no  reason  why  consideration  of  the  speaker's  beliefs  and  other  pragmatic
phenomena should ask for  genuine  inferential  explanations,  once  we take into account  the full
power of associative processes.
In sum, my position has commonalities with, and differences from, both RT and Recanati's view.
I share with RT the idea of one single automatic mechanism for the explanation of any pragmatic
fact.  On  the  other  hand,  relevance  theorists  assume  that  such  an  automatic  mechanism  is
nonetheless properly inferential; my suggestion – in line with Recanati's view of lexical pragmatics
– is, instead, that it is associative, and that its inferential effects are a side effect of the dynamics of
associative activation.
This is not to say that an explanation at a purely subpersonal level is all we need in pragmatics. A
widespread intuition is that pragmatic interpretations are something that is adopted by a subject, at a
personal level. I think that this intuition is correct; my view is that subpersonal automatic processing
cooperate with personal, controlled processing in almost every episode of utterance understanding.
However, the cooperation between personal and subpersonal processing is largely beyond the scope
of this paper (see Mazzone in preparation). My point here is just  that inferential  effects can be
granted at a subpersonal level, by way of purely associative processes.
In practice, I will start (section 1) by introducing Recanati's (2004) appeal to schemata in the
service  of  his  conception  of  primary  pragmatic  processes,  conceived  as  a  type  of  associative
processes. Then, in section 2, it will be argued that an appeal to associative processes in pragmatics
has very strong grounds, and that to some extent also RT has to grant this. Section 3 will analyze
RT's main argument against associative accounts, and will find it inconclusive insofar as it does not
take into consideration the role played by schemata in constraining associative processes. Thanks to
this contribution of schemata, associative processes may be thought to have the capacity to mimick
inferential processes. This conclusion will be generalized in section 4: it is argued that associative
2 In Recanati (2007), it must be said, a partial revision of this position is suggested. I will discuss this below.
relations in general,  far  from being purely based on statistical  co-occurrence,  have a motivated
structure, and that schemata are but especially evident instances of motivated associative relations.
Section  5  will  be  devoted  to  show how the  same  associative  mechanisms described  here  can
substantiate an overall theoretical framework in linguistics, and section 6 to assess whether those
associative mechanisms may account for a consideration of the speaker's beliefs.
1. Primary pragmatic processes and schemata
Grice (1989) has famously distinguished between two layers of meaning: “what is said” by an
utterance, and “what is implicated” by the speaker in uttering that utterance in a specific situation.
In Grice's own account, determining what is implicated requires an inferential step: the hearer has to
draw some implicatures, that is, a specific type of implications based on a certain number of general
assumptions about  the  speaker's  rational  attitude towards  communication.  In  contrast,  the  mere
comprehension of what is said is conceived by Grice as a process that involves neither assumptions
about speakers nor inferences. To put it in terms that have become established in current debates,
while  determining  what  is  implicated  is  supposed  to  require  a  genuine  pragmatic  process,
determining what is said would rather ask for a semantic process based on linguistic meaning, and
appealing to context only to the very limited extent that this is mandated by linguistic form.
More recently, however,  some scholars have argued against this picture by claiming that the
distinction between what is said and what is implicated, for clear and important  that it  can be,
cannot be framed in terms of a distinction between semantics and pragmatics. Understanding what
is  said  would  require  a  substantial  appeal  to  contextual  factors  as  well,  well  beyond  what  is
mandated by linguistic form: hence, also the determination of what is said would be a pragmatic
affair, in the end. In this respect, Recanati and relevance theorists find themselves on the same side
of the divide: they share a so-called contextualist position with regard to the determination of what
is said. Where they part company is when it comes to the role of inferential processes based on
assumptions about the speaker.
Relevance theorists reject the Gricean view that inferential processes intervene only in delivering
what is implicated: in their framework not only the determination of both what is said and what is
implicated is a pragmatic affair, but, moreover, one and the same process is responsible for the two,
and this is precisely an inferential process involving assumptions about the speaker. In contrast, on
this point Recanati has a more conservative view in the sense that it  preserves Grice's intuition
about the special character of implicatures. Recanati believes in fact that the processes delivering
the explicit content of the utterance (what is said), although pragmatic in their own right, are of a
different nature from the properly inferential processes which Grice had proposed as an explanation
of the implicit content (what is implicated). Primary pragmatic processes – as Recanati calls the
former,  while  the  latter  are  dubbed secondary pragmatic  processes  – are  conceived of  as  local
associative processes,  based  on the spreading of  activation within conceptual  networks and the
consequent degree of activation of concepts in the network. In other words, a concept would be
contributed to the explicit content of the utterance insofar as that concept is the most accessible (i.e.
the most activated) for the system given the situation. In Recanati's words:
“In the model I have in mind, the literal meaning of the expression is accessed first
and  triggers  the  activation  of  associatively  related  representations.  That  literal
meaning is a natural candidate for the status of semantic value, but there are others:
some of the representations activated by association contribute further candidates
for  the  status  of  semantic  value.  All  candidates,  whether  literal  or  derived,  are
processed in parallel and compete” (Recanati, 2004: 28).
It is important to consider the temporal dynamics of this parallel processing and competition. In
Recanati's picture, literal meanings have an initial advantage over other possible candidates; this
cannot imply of course that literal meanings – or, more generally, concepts endowed with an initial
advantage – always win the competition. Recanati (2004) emphasizes the importance of what he
calls  “accessibility  shifts”:  in  the  course of  processing,  contextual  information  may change the
accessibility of any concept activated previously, by adding a new train of activation to the process.
For a very simple example of disambiguation (see Carston 2007), let us consider the following
utterance:
(1) I'm going to the bank now to get some cash.
Since  there  are  two  possible  meanings  for  “bank”  (FINANCIAL INSTITUTION,  RIVER
SIDE)3, the problem is how the system may come to choose the right one. Let us suppose that, for
whatever reason, at  the moment when the lexical form “bank” is processed the most accessible
meaning is the wrong one (RIVER SIDE). However, we can expect an accessibility shift as soon as
the word “cash” is processed, since this word activates its meaning, which in turn triggers a number
of concepts having to do with money, and this presumably provides further activation to the concept
of bank as financial institution. As Carston (2007) notes, it is also possible that starting from the
activation of  CASH, a  stereotypical  frame or  script  for GETTING MONEY FROM A BANK1
(where  BANK1 =  FINANCIAL  INSTITUTION)  is  recalled,  thus  further  strengthening  the
activation of BANK1.
This last suggestion is crucial, and it goes in the same direction as Recanati's discussion of the
role of schemata: the key point is the contribution of knowledge frames in bridging conceptual
contents in the service of comprehension. Recanati (2004) addresses this issue through the analysis
of the following utterance:
(2) John was arrested by a policeman yesterday; he had just stolen a wallet.
Here the focus is on how to assign a reference to the pronoun “he” in the second sentence. Just as
in the above case of ambiguity, as soon as the pronoun is uttered we may assume to have two
candidates, John and the policeman, and even supposing that for some reason the policeman is at
that moment a more accessible candidate than John, the situation can be expected to change when
the whole sentence is processed. The reason is that the predicate “had stolen” can be thought to
recall a frame or schema where stealing and being arrested are connected in such a way that one and
the same person is the subject of both.
“This schema is jointly activated by the predicates 'was arrested' and 'had stolen'.
An interpretation in which the same person steals and is arrested (and in which he
is arrested because he has stolen […]) satisfies the schema, and is more likely to be
selected than one which violates it” (Recanati, 2004: 36).
In this way, schemata drive the interpretation process by promoting the search for coherence in
interpretation: “Coherent, schema-instantiating interpretations […] tend to be selected and preferred
over non-integrated or 'loose' interpretations” (Recanati, 2004: 37). It must be emphasized that this
coherence-producing role of schemata is said to depend on an entirely associative mechanism: on
the one hand, “a schema is activated by, or accessed through, an expression whose semantic value
corresponds to an aspect of the schema”; on the other hand, the “schema thus activated in turn raises
the accessibility of whatever possible semantic values for other constituents of the sentence happen
to fit the schema” (ibidem).
As an account of primary pragmatic processes and the role of schemata within them, this is
enough for our purposes.  Now, relevance theorists,  and especially  Robyn Carston (2007),  have
argued against  Recanati's  distinction  between  primary  and  secondary  pragmatic  processes  with
arguments that I find in part convincing. Nonetheless, as far as I can tell, the thesis that the sort of
associative processes described above have a role to play in utterance understanding cannot  be
easily dismissed, for reasons we will address in the next section.
3 We follow the convention of writing concepts with capital letters.
2. The dynamics of accessibility
To put it simply, a first general point is that associative processes are a well-established fact with
regard to the basic functioning of our cortex in its entirety, and it is very hard to find a domain of
cognitive  processing  which stays  entirely unaffected by them. In particular,  there is  the largest
possible evidence that we collect information from the environment by coding regularities thanks to
the strengthening of synaptic connections between neurons and between neuron assemblies, and
that we can subsequently exploit that information thanks to a simple dynamics of accessibility: the
more two pieces of information are regularly connected in our experience, the more the connections
between them (between their representations) are strong, and the more accessible they are to each
other. Since this is basically the way in which we detect and store information, it can be expected
that associative access forms the basis of the brain's automatic activity every time we have to resort
to our stored knowledge.
I see no reason why pragmatic processes should be an exception to this generalization: to the
extent that they need to resort to information of sorts – be it lexical information linked to words, or
more general world knowledge – it is reasonable to expect that associative processes of the kind
described above are at play. Interestingly, as a matter of fact such an assumption appears to be made
in many places within relevance theorists' work. For instance, let us consider Wilson and Carston's
(2007)  explanation  of  how,  in  accordance  with  RT,  the  word  “angel”  could  be  interpreted
metaphorically in the following question-answer pair:
(3) Peter: Will Sally look after the children if we get ill?
Mary: Sally is an angel.
Wilson and Carston (2007: 28)4 make appeal to the fact that “the stereotypical angel is a good
angel, and the encyclopaedic properties of stereotypical category members are likely to be highly
accessible  as  a  result  of  frequent  use”.  This  would  cause  that  certain  properties  –  such  as
EXCEPTIONALLY GOOD  AND  KIND,  WATCHES  OVER HUMANS  AND  HELPS  THEM
WHEN NEEDED, etc. – “are likely to be strongly activated” (ibidem). These properties could then
“receive  additional  activation  from  other  items  in  the  context”  (ibidem):  for  instance,  Peter's
question may arguably reinforce the features of goodness and helpfulness. Although this account is
intended to be embedded in a relevance-theoretic framework, here a key role is clearly assigned to
the dynamics of accessibility:  stereotypicality  and frequency of use are said to account  for the
accessibility  of  concepts  and  properties,  and  hence  for  their  degree  of  activation;  moreover,
activation may change as an effect of new contextual inputs – an accessibility shift, in Recanati's
terms.
Apart  from specific examples,  a vast  number of explanations in RT's writings are framed in
terms  of  representation  accessibility  and activation.  Such a  propensity  has  also  been explicitly
theorized and embraced in some occasions. For instance, Wilson and Carston (2006) ask themselves
how much their explanation of metaphors should
“mesh with psycholinguistic investigations of the online comprehension process
designed to show, for instance, […] at what stage a particular feature associated
with the encoded concept may be activated or suppressed. Let's suppose that the
feature  FEMALE  ROYAL is  closely  associated  with,  hence  activated  by,  the
encoded concept PRINCESS […]” (Wilson and Carston, 2006: 405).
Wilson and Carston's answer is that RT, along with other cognitively oriented approaches, aims
to provide an account of metaphor which is consistent with the sort of explanations here referred to.
In their “Concluding remarks”, they explicitly explain where associative considerations of this sort
would dovetail RT. While other accounts of metaphor
4 Here and below, page numbers refer to the online version of the paper: 
http://www.phon.ucl.ac.uk/home/robyn/pdf/Wilson-Carston-Unitary-Approach-2007.pdf.
“(specifically  those  in  the  cognitive  linguistics  literature)  appeal  to  (non-
inferential)  associative  mechanisms  based  on  domain  mappings  of  one  sort  or
another  [...]  on  our  inferential  account,  such  associative  links  may  affect  the
outcome  of  the  mutual  adjustment  process  by  altering  the  accessibility  of
contextual  assumptions and implications,  but  the resulting overall  interpretation
will only be accepted as the speaker’s intended meaning if it satisfies the hearer’s
expectations  of  relevance  and  is  properly  warranted  by  the  inferential
comprehension heuristic  discussed  [above  in  that  paper]”  (Wilson  and Carston,
2006: 429).
What this citation suggests is that associative mechanisms might play their role in the initial
stages of pragmatic processing, by determining the degree of activation of concepts and properties
which are then to be injected in the properly inferential  component of the process. Wilson and
Carston (2007) propose a unitary account of lexical pragmatics according to which, in the usual
inferential jargon, an appropriate set of encyclopaedic assumptions is selected “to act as premises
for the derivation of the expected contextual implications”; but we are explained that
“The appropriateness of different sets of encyclopaedic assumptions depends, on
the one hand, on their degree of accessibility in the particular discourse context,
and, on the other, on the potential contextual implications they yield” (Wilson and
Carston, 2007: 31).
In other words, derivation of contextual implications and the dynamics of accessibility are seen
as two distinct components of the comprehension process, with concepts and properties being at the
junction of the two: on the one hand, concepts are activated by associative processes, while, on the
other hand, they feed the properly inferential side of the process. To be more precise, RT is clearly
committed to a non-linear conception of pragmatic processing: they speak of a mutual adjustment
mechanism  working  in  parallel,  without  a  rigid  sequential  order.  In  this  vein,  the  integration
between associative activation and derivation of implications should not be thought of as if the
former necessarily came before the latter. Expectations about possible contextual implications could
drive the process from the beginning, while derivations fed by new inputs could change the degree
of activation of some concepts or properties.
In  sum,  relevance  theorists  acknowledge  that  associative  processes  are  a  well-established
psycholinguistic  fact,  and  assign  a  role  to  these  processes  in  their  account  of  utterance
understanding.  However,  this  role  is  only  peripheral,  insofar  as  it  is  inferential  derivation  of
contextual implications which is judged to be a genuine pragmatic process. Here the first thing to
notice is that, on epistemological grounds, associative activation and inferential derivation do not
have  the  same status:  the  latter  is  not  nearly  as  established as  the former;  it  is  in  fact  largely
hypothetical.5 Secondly,  if  it  is  true  –  as  I  am going to  argue  in  a  moment  – that  associative
processes have the power to produce inferential effects, then the hypothesis of a genuine inferential
process  in  utterance  understanding appears to  be  wholly redundant,  or  even worse,  difficult  to
accommodate.
3. Inferences by associations?
In  his  reply to  Carston  (2007),  Recanati  (2007:  3)6 suggests  that  “[his]  'dumb'  processes  of
activation and association may well mimick the smart, inferential processes posited by Relevance
Theory”.  Is  it  possible  to  make  sense  of  this  suggestion?  Is  it  possible  to  mimick  inferential
5 Of course, here I do not refer to inferential derivations in general, but to the hypothesis of automatic inferential
processes in pragmatic processing. There is no doubt that we humans do make inferences in explicit reasoning. The
question is how much empirical support has the claim that we understand utterances by way of automatic inferences
we are not conscious of.
6 Here and below the page numbers refer to the online version of the paper: 
http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/docs/00/05/36/65/PDF/ijn_00000633_00.pdf
processes by way of association-and-activation processes?
Within RT, the clearest and most extensive argument against associative accounts has been put
forth by Wilson and Carston (2007) in the context of a discussion of lexical pragmatics, where the
authors  take  into  consideration,  besides  RT's  inferential  account,  also  some  purely  (or
predominantly) non-inferential accounts and mixed associative/inferential approaches. The general
line of thought is made clear through the analysis of Kintsch's (2000, 2001) connectionist model.
Kintsch
“uses a spreading activation model based on statistical associations among lexical
items in a corpus to account for differences between the literal and metaphorical
interpretations of the predicate 'is a shark'. According to his data, close associates
of the word 'shark' include the words 'fins', 'dolphin', 'diver', and 'fish', and these
associations  provide  the  basis  for  his  account.  These  are  classic  cases  of  non-
inferential association, in which the associates of 'shark' are not logically related to
it in any systematic way (for instance, 'x is a shark' entails 'x is a fish', but does not
entail 'x is a dolphin' or 'x is a diver') and the associations provide  no basis for
drawing warranted conclusions” (Wilson and Carston, 2007: 21, my emphasis).
Wilson and Carston presume that there is a general cognitive lesson to be learned, and it is that
although  all  inferential  relationships  are  also  associations  (in  that  “an  inferential  mechanism
establishes  systematic  correspondences  between (constituents of)  premises  and (constituents of)
conclusions”, ibidem), not all associations are inferential.
“In the minds of many speakers of English, for instance, 'shark' is non-inferentially
associated with 'diver', 'salt' with 'pepper', 'love' with 'hate', and so on” (Wilson and
Carston, 2007: 23).
As a consequence, “purely or partly associative accounts will  vastly overgenerate,  and some
method of filtering out unwanted associations will be required” (idem: 35). To sum up, the general
idea seems to be that associative processes are unconstrained with respect to drawing warranted
conclusions about both what is said and what is implicated by an utterance. So the question is: is
there any way in which associative processes could constrain themselves, so to speak?
First of all, it is important to keep in mind a mechanism which is part of Recanati's account of
primary pragmatic processes: apart from the mere spreading of activation in a conceptual network,
we need to consider the dynamics of different trains of activation interfering with each other by
adding  or  subtracting  activation  to  previously  activated  items.  More  specifically,  Recanati  has
focussed on how this dynamics could promote a search for coherence thanks to the mediating role
of abstract schemata.
Let us recall the two examples we considered before:
(1) I'm going to the bank now to get some cash.
(2) John was arrested by a policeman yesterday; he had just stolen a wallet.
In  the  first  example,  a  schema  for  GETTING  MONEY FROM  A BANK1 (=FINANCIAL
INSTITUTION) is supposed to account (at least in part) for the fact that the right meaning is chosen
between the two candidates for “bank” (FINANCIAL INSTITUTION, RIVER SIDE). In the second
example, in order to explain how the right reference for “he” is selected, Recanati appeals to a
schema connecting stealing and being arrested in such a way that one and the same person is the
subject of both (more formally: STEAL (X) – IS ARRESTED (X)). To be more precise, Recanati
thinks that the information coded by the schema might be richer than this:  presumably,  it  also
includes a causal relationship between the predicates, so that
“[a]n interpretation in which the same person steals and is arrested (and in which
he is arrested because he has stolen […]) satisfies the schema, and is more likely
to be selected than one which violates it” (Recanati, 2004: 36, my emphasis).
In this sense, according to Recanati schemata provide the world knowledge which is apt to drive
the interpretation process in a top down way: not only they constrain the blind spreading activation
process, they also add information which does not correspond to any aspect of the uttered sentence
(Recanati, 2004: 37). In our example, the schema may provide the stereotypical information that the
relation between stealing and being arrested is a causal one.
A first consideration to be made is that, once again, Recanati is making appeal to a piece of
explanation which cannot be dismissed easily, and that is in fact presupposed by RT's account as
well: the need for schemata accounting for our world knowledge. Let us consider, for instance, the
following example made by Carston (2007) to illustrate how RT explains utterance interpretation:
(4) Ann: I expected Jane to be here by now.
Bob: She missed her coach.
Carston's account of how the meaning of “coach” is selected is along the usual lines of RT: it has
the form of a derivation of conclusions from certain assumptions. Now, what is of particular interest
to us is one of the assumptions:
MISSING A DESIGNATED COACH2 IS  A REASON  FOR A PERSON NOT ARRIVING
WHEN EXPECTED
where COACH2 stays for the interpretation of “coach” as a bus, rather than an instructor. This
assumption is clearly a frame of knowledge rooted in our experience; a script of this sort is probably
part of people's world knowledge in Western countries. Not only is the assumption a schema in
Recanati's terms, it is also structurally similar to the schema
STEALING IS A REASON FOR A PERSON BEING ARRESTED
in our previous example. Therefore, Carston's explanation can be certainly said to make use of
schemata. But this conclusion plausibly applies to any of RT's examples since, without frames of
knowledge of this kind, no pragmatic derivation could be performed at all.
Moreover, schemata appears to serve the same purpose in both Recanati's and RT's accounts we
have considered: they help to select the correct meaning of ambiguous words. Conceptually, we
may  say  that  schemata  narrow  the  logical  space  of  interpretation,  by  discarding  properties
(reference  assignments,  etc.)  which  might  suggest  alternative  lines  of  interpretation,  and  by
preserving only the conceptual pieces which can be made sense of, insofar as they are subsumed
under a rule – so to speak. In a word: schemata contribute to filter out unwanted associations. In this
perspective, it makes perfectly sense that RT adopts an association-and-activation mechanism as the
first stage of processing in lexical pragmatics (see our discussion in section 2). A proliferation of the
concepts potentially involved in interpretation is needed anyway – it accounts for the treatment of
polysemy, for the adjustment of meaning to contexts, including meaning transfers etc.. In Carston's
example  (4),  we may well  imagine  that  both  meanings  of  “coach”  (BUS,  INSTRUCTOR) are
associatively activated. But then, we need a mechanism for discarding the wrong associations, and
this is where schemata intervenes: they tell us which pieces of information fit each other, and which
do not, in accordance with our world knowledge.
Where RT and Recanati part company is with regard to how this conceptual description of the
role  of  schemata  – as  filtering out  unwanted associations – is  cashed out  in  processing  terms:
whether  by  way  of  associative  or  inferential  processes.  In  RT's  perspective,  schemata  are
assumptions acting as premises (or conclusions) in inferential derivations. However, this is not the
only possibility: contrary to Wilson and Carston's claim, also associative accounts may grant an
explanation  of  how  schemata  filter  out  unwanted  associations.  In  practice,  as  Recanati  has
insightfully observed, schemata can be associatively activated by any of their constituents, and then
in turn activate concepts they are constituted of while presumably inhibiting competing ones. In the
previous  example,  the  activation  of  the  schema  MISSING  A DESIGNATED  COACH2 IS  A
REASON FOR A PERSON NOT ARRIVING WHEN EXPECTED may be expected to further
activate the concept BUS while inhibiting the concept INSTRUCTOR. Schemata thus bridge pieces
of information (the concept BUS and other contextual items) in a motivated manner, thus filtering
out  unwanted  associations.  Since  schemata  are  structured  patterns  of  information,  they  in  fact
introduce a conceptual structure within the activated network of contents, so that the final outcome
of  the  associative  dynamics  is  far  from  random.  This  is  probably  why  Recanati  claims  that
associative  processes  may  well  mimick  inferential  processes:  because  schemata  constrain  the
associative dynamics so as to obtain a motivated outcome, i.e., the same outcome that would be
obtained  through  an  inferential  process  employing  the  same  schemata  as  assumptions  (or
conclusions).
For instance, the schema
MISSING A DESIGNATED COACH2 IS  A REASON  FOR A PERSON NOT ARRIVING
WHEN EXPECTED
may be intended both as an assumption in an inferential derivation and as an activated pattern of
representation in an associative process: in both cases, it may play a key role in the explanation of
how the right meaning of “coach” is selected. Or, for another example, let us recall the question-
answer pair in (3):
(3) Peter: Will Sally look after the children if we get ill?
Mary: Sally is an angel.
As we saw, Wilson and Carston observe that some of the features associated to “angel” could
receive further activation from items in the context: for instance, Peter's question might reinforce
the features of goodness and helpfulness. This amounts to suggesting the existence of a schema
which  correlates  these  features  with  certain  behaviors  (looking  after  the  children,  helping  ill
people). Such a schema could also be recruited as an assumption in an inferential account of (3).
However, it  is interesting that in this case even Wilson and Carston (2007) seem to explain the
augmented activation of certain features by way of an associative dynamics implicitly involving
schemata, rather than by way of an inferential derivation recruiting those schemata as assumptions.
In  sum,  Wilson  and  Carston's  argument  against  associative  accounts  does  not  seem  to  be
conclusive: associative accounts may have an explanation of how unwanted associations are filtered
out.  This  explanation,  based  on  the  notion  of  schema,  has  also  the  resources  to  explain  how
inferential  effects  might  be  obtained  without  inferential  processing:  associative  processes
constrained by schemata have a motivated outcome, that is, an outcome that can be accounted for
by post hoc reconstructions where the same schemata are taken as assumptions (or conclusions) in
inferential derivations. But then, one may wonder why we should appeal to a genuinely inferential
account, insofar as we may count on a largely best established explanation – that is, by associative
processing – of the same phenomena.7 Even worse, one may wonder how a genuinely inferential
account can be reconciled with an associative one. Since nearly everyone grants that associative
access forms the basis of the brain's automatic recovery of stored knowledge, and since schemata
are but patterns of stored knowledge, why and how the contribution of schemata – as it has been
described by Recanati  – should be blocked within associative processes, while schemata would
rather be recruited in processes of a completely different kind, that is, inferential derivations?
7 To repeat: as it should be clear, I am not denying that post hoc, conscious inferential reconstructions are occasionally
made and have a role to play in human reasoning and communication. I just want to suggest that we do not need to
postulate an automatic inferential process of comprehension.
4. Schemata and contingencies
The previous considerations do not imply that there is nothing unconstrained in association-and-
activation accounts: the spreading of activation in conceptual networks is relatively unconstrained,
insofar as it is a blind bottom up process. But, as Recanati has noticed, the dynamics of accessibility
has in itself a counterbalance to spreading activation, since we can count on a number of structured
representations which constrain the process in a top down way. In other words, to the extent that
activated contents are already arranged in a motivated manner – they are in fact constituents of
schemata – their blind activation is soon submitted to a reciprocal assessment of coherence: each
accessed content activates related schemata, which may compete or integrate with each other, until
they coherently frame the whole situation. It should be emphasized that this assessment is top down
only in the limited sense that current inputs are arranged and understood thanks to the contribution
of (more) general information. We are not making appeal to any top down personal process – as I
said, the contribution of that kind of processes is matter for another paper. So, in a sense we are still
speaking of blind, subpersonal processes, delivering smart effects all the same.
Now I would like to go even a bit further: it is not only that Wilson and Carston's argument is not
conclusive, in that it underestimates the possibility that associative processes constrain themselves;
also the premise of their argument is at risk of misrepresenting associative phenomena. The premise
is that associated contents are  “not logically related [to each other] in any systematic way” (to
repeat  Wilson and Carston's  words).  This  assumption,  to  be  honest,  is  widespread through the
literature, probably for the same reason that it is adopted by Wilson and Carston: because scholars
have in  mind “statistical  associations between lexical  items in a corpus” (again,  in Wilson and
Carston's words). However, some considerations are in order. First, the fact that lexical items in a
corpus have no other relation with each other than their co-occurrence in texts does not mean that
they have no motivated relation at all: they have in fact a rather specific type of relation, one of the
greatest importance for human cognition. The sensitivity to the distribution of words in texts is a
component of our ability to arrange new utterances – more or less so depending on the theory of
syntax and semantics one embraces. Second, there is no reason on earth why we should identify
associative relations exclusively with statistical associations between lexical items. Our cognitive
system is  sensitive  to  different  types  of  contingencies  (also  outside  texts,  luckily):  part-whole
contingencies, spatial contingencies, temporal contingencies, causal contingencies and so on. Co-
occurrence of words in a text is but one of these many types. Third, as it seems, it is not as if
something from outside had to tell our cognitive system what to do with temporal, rather than – let's
say – causal or textual, contingencies: in other words, contingencies are not stored in such a way
that  the relationships between their elements are in need of interpretation.  On the contrary,  our
coding of contingencies preserves information on both which contents are connected with each
other and  how they are connected. Thus, stored spatial contingencies are put to use in arranging
inputs spatially, stored causal contingencies bridge inputs in accordance with causal schemata, and
so on and so forth.
In sum, it is wrong to equate associative relationships with statistical co-occurrences of lexical
items, insofar as the latter are only a particular kind of the former. And it is wrong to assume that
associative  relationships  are  not  logically  related  to  each  other  in  any systematic  way;  on  the
contrary, any kind of associative relationships has its own logical structure (causal, spatial, textual
and so on). Therefore,  one may doubt that there is  a clear boundary between representation of
contingencies in general, on the one hand, and the notion of abstract schema we considered above,
on the other: in the end, all our representations are endowed with structure. In this sense, schemata,
frames,  scripts  and  the  like  can  be  considered  just  different  manifestations  of  a  more  basic
phenomenon: our brain's capacity to detect and code patterns of contingencies of different sorts in
our sensory and motor experience (e.g. Fuster 2001, 2003; Mazzone and Lalumera 2010; Plebe and
Mazzone in preparation). The abstract schemata (frames, scripts, etc.) we are used to refer to in
pragmatics – such as, for instance, MISSING A DESIGNATED COACH2 IS A REASON FOR A
PERSON NOT ARRIVING WHEN EXPECTED, or STEAL (X)-IS ARRESTED (X) and so on –
are simply stored contingencies that we need for our explanatory purposes, and that we assume are
general enough for being attributed to normal speakers, or to normal cognitive subjects in general.
But all associations have a schematic structure, insofar as associated contents are logically related to
each other in a variety of systematic manners.8
If this is true, we should expect that our previous considerations on the associative dynamics
generalize to many other phenomena than the ones considered by Recanati. As we have argued,
throughout our experience  associative relationships arrange mental contents into the same logical
structure we may also occasionally exploit in reflective reasoning. Associative relations are then
rich enough for associative processes to explain cognitive phenomena which have been thought
instead to ask for rule-based, specialized processes. An important example is linguistic theory, as we
are going to show in the next section.
5. Schemata and linguistic theory
It can be shown that constraint-based accounts in linguistics9 make implicitly use of the very
same notion of associative schema we described above. This opens the possibility to imagine a
unified  explanation  for  strictly  linguistic  and  pragmatic  phenomena  –  and  of  course,  for
extralinguistic phenomena as well. Moreover, an argument can be arranged (along the same line of
reasoning  as  above  in  section  2)  to  the  effect  that  linguistic  theory  should  take  into  account
associative processes and that this leaves little room for alternative rule-based explanations.
Let  us  start  from this  last  point.  As we already noticed,  associative  processes  based on the
detection of regular co-occurrence of stimuli in the world are the basic mechanism for storage of
information in the brain and for its subsequent exploitation. Besides, for all we know, there is no
evidence that such a mechanism is specifically dismissed or neutralized in the presence of linguistic
input.  Therefore,  we should not  disregard the role  plausibly played by associative processes  in
language processing, although this might raise the problem of how to integrate associative  and
specialized linguistic processes. But a further question is: once we grant that associative processes
play a role in linguistics, is it the case that we still need specialized processes? A negative answer
has been given for instance by Jackendoff (2002, 2007a, 2007b). Although his theory has its roots in
Generative Grammar, he has maintained that linguistic phenomena – syntax included – may be
explained by a general-domain, constraint-based mechanism. Crucially, while in the mainstream
view of Generative Grammar phrase structure has been represented in terms of  procedural rules,
Jackendoff proposes that any linguistic information including phrase structure is rather captured by
regular patterns of representation essentially abstracted away from experience:10
“words, regular affixes, idioms, constructions, and ordinary phrase structure rules
[…] can all be expressed in a common formalism, namely as pieces of structure
stored in long-term memory” (Jackendoff, 2007a: 11).
As a  consequence,  Jackendoff's  explanation  does  not  rely  anymore  on  specialized  linguistic
8 These ideas are very close to Fillmore's conception of concepts as embedded in frames which logically link them
with  other  concepts  (e.g,  Fillmore  1976).  To  put  it  differently,  Fillmore's  idea  that  our  knowledge  is  entirely
structured by frames is in line with the fundamental neurobiological assumption that our brain is essentially oriented
towards the detection of  contingencies  and,  therefore,  sensitive  to  structured patterns  of information.  This is  a
consequence of the Hebb's rule governing natural  neural  networks (Fuster  2001, 2003; Mazzone and Lalumera
2010; Plebe and Mazzone in preparation).
9 In  psycholinguistics,  “the  term  'constraint-based'  seems  generally  to  be  used  to  denote  a  lexically  driven
connectionist architecture along the lines of MacDonald et al. (1994)” (Jackendoff 2007a, 9). However, in linguistics
the term has been used more generally to refer to models in which parallel activation of, and competition between,
representations substitute for procedural rules, in syntax and elsewhere (e.g. Trueswell et al. 1994; Ferreira et al.
2002; Jackendoff 2007a; Breheny et al. 2006). In this sense, constraint-based processes and associative processes
can be seen as two sides of  the same coin:  as  a  consequence of  spreading of  activation within an associative
network, each activated representation may act as a constraint on the overall process, since it may contribute to
inhibit the outcomes which are not compatible with it.
10 With the possible exception of a very restricted number of innate constraints.
(namely,  syntactic)  processes  operating  in  accordance  with  procedural  rules;  rather,  linguistic
representations (“pieces of structure”) have inside them the information on how to be assembled
with  each  other,  and  all  we  need  is  a  general-domain  process  which  mechanically  assembles
representations in accordance with that information:
“The  'generation'  of  novel  sentences  is  accomplished  across  the  board  by  the
operation  of  clipping  together  pieces  of  stored  structure,  an  operation  called
unification” (Jackendoff, 2007a: 11, his emphasis).
For  instance,  in  order  to  produce  (or  to  parse)  a  nominal  phrase  (NP)  we  do  not  need  a
procedural rule such as
NP → Det – N;
it is enough to have a stored pattern delivering the same information. Now, it is easy to see that
such a stored pattern is a schema in the sense we proposed above: an arrangement of items which
prescribes how to bridge pieces of information (Det, N) in a regulated manner.
If by substituting pieces of stored structure for procedural rules we don't loose information, since
the former preserves the logical structure of the latter, it is further claimed that a constraint-based
account do even better than mainstream Generative Grammar in accounting for linguistic data. This
is because “constraints can be violable and can compete with each other” (Jackendoff, 2007a: 9),
and therefore “structural complexity (and less than perfect grammaticality) [which is attested in
linguistic data] can arise through constraint conflict” (Jackendoff, 2007b: 10)11. As it can be seen,
constraint-based  processes  are  conceived  of  as  an  overall  alternative  to  specialized  linguistic
processes, rather than as complementary to them.
The so-called “stored pieces of structure” act as constraints insofar as they produce the reciprocal
assessment of coherence we described above (section 4): seen from the side of language perception,
linguistic items activate the stored pieces of structure they are constituents of, and these pieces of
structure then compete or integrate with each other, until some (more or less) stable and coherent
integration  is  reached.  In  constraint-satisfaction  models  this  mechanism  is  thought  to  involve
different  levels  of  linguistic  and  extra-linguistic  information,  in  parallel  and  without  any  rigid
sequential order. Jackendoff (2007a) provides an example where disambiguation of phonological
structure is accomplished thanks to semantic interpretation. Let us consider the utterance:
(5) It's not a parent, it's actually a child.
Jackendoff (2007a: 14) observes that (“at least in [his] dialect”) “a parent” and “apparent” are
phonetically identical. So how can the hearer select the right phonological structure? The answer
needs to make appeal to the meaning of the utterance. In particular, Jackendoff assumes that at a
certain moment the construction It's not X, it's (actually) Y is activated: this construction implies a
semantic contrast between X and Y; as a consequence, as soon as the content A CHILD is linked to
the role Y, the interpretation “a parent” is strongly favored over “apparent” for the role X. It should
not be necessary to emphasize how much this reconstruction is similar to the above explanations of
the utterances (1) and (2):
(1) I'm going to the bank now to get some cash.
(2) John was arrested by a policeman yesterday; he had just stolen a wallet.
In these two examples,  the way a certain linguistic form is  interpreted (respectively,  “cash”,
“he”) depends on the fact that other inputs recall from long-term memory a schema (respectively,
11 The page number refers to the online version of the paper: 
http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/incbios/RayJackendoff/LinguisticsinCognitive.pdf
GETTING MONEY FROM A BANK1, STEAL (X) – IS ARRESTED (X)) which hooks – so to
speak – one of the possible contents as the most coherent with the schema. In Jackendoff's example,
a certain input (“a parent”) is given the correct phonological interpretation thanks to the fact that
other inputs recall from long-term memory a schema which selects one of the possible phonological
interpretations as the most coherent with it. In each of these cases, the explanation hangs on the
dynamics of accessibility and an assessment of coherence driven by schemata.
I do not insist further on Jackendoff's account, since my purpose here is not to advocate it in the
first place, but rather to show an important theoretical convergence. As it seems, it is possible to
conceive of a unified account of pragmatic and other linguistic phenomena, in accord with what is
known about the basic, associative processes through which we store and exploit information. My
previous  considerations  on  associative  relationships  (section  4)  suggested  that  the  associative
account of pragmatic phenomena put forth by Recanati would naturally apply to other domains as
well. Now we find that in fact a growing body of research in linguistics makes a similar appeal to
associative processes and schematic information.12 This gives an indirect support to a main thesis of
this paper: both in syntax and in pragmatics, it can be argued that associative processes have enough
logical  structure  to  account  for  cognitive  operations  which  can  be  ex  post  reconstructed  as
derivations  based  on  rules  or  schemata.  Therefore,  in  both  domains  we  can  do  without  the
hypothesis of automatic inferential derivations, to the extent that the same cognitive effects may be
obtained through associative, constraint-based processes.
In this section, we have briefly shown how associative accounts are appealed to in linguistics in
order to  explain a  variety of  phenomena,  from phonological  recognition to  syntax.  In the  next
section, we intend to ask whether more complex pragmatic phenomena than the ones considered
above can be accounted for within a purely associative account. The purpose is to suggest that we
should consider seriously the possibility to apply associative explanations to a number of different
phenomena in pragmatics.
6. Reading minds without mind-reading abilities
Couldn't it be the case that associative processes explain utterance understanding for very simple
pragmatic phenomena – disambiguations, reference assignments, lexical pragmatics and the like –
while  more  complex  phenomena,  especially  the  ones  involving  consideration  of  the  speaker's
beliefs and intentions, ask for more sophisticated explanations?
In fact, as we already saw, Recanati (2004) conceives of primary pragmatic processes as not
involving assumptions about the speaker, but it is not clear that even the explanation of the simplest
pragmatic phenomena can do without assumptions of that kind.13 Carston (2007) has made a case to
this effect. Let us suppose that Mary is addressed by her student Sarah with the utterance in (6), and
that Mary knows two people called “Neil”, her young son (NEIL1) and a colleague in the linguistics
department where she works (NEIL2).
(6) Neil has broken his leg.
Now, let us further suppose that Mary is constantly worried about her son, who tends to get into
a lot  of  trouble,  therefore  her  NEIL1 concept  is  candidate  to  become more active than NEIL2,
whatever the circumstances in which (6) is uttered. In Carston's opinion, the simple dynamics of
activation  cannot  account  for  the  fact  that  presumably,  in  that  scenario,  Mary's  preferred
interpretation will be instead NEIL2, since she is aware that Sarah does not even know her son Neil,
12 In this vein, one should also mention construction-based approaches (e.g.,  Goldberg 1995, 2006),  which can be
showed to share the basic principles of Jackendoff's (2007a) approach here referred to.
13 As  an  anonymous  referee  has  correctly  emphasized,  everyone  in  pragmatics  acknowledges  that  in  genuine
communication people must appreciate the speaker's communicative intentions as such (the fact that the speaker
intends to say p and to implicate q) and that, to this extent, consideration of the speaker's mind is a necessary part of
any process of interpretation. What is at issue here is just whether  specific information about what the speaker
knows or intends need to be considered in any pragmatic stage of processing and in that case, which kind of process
is responsible for this consideration.
while she knows that Mary has a colleague whose name is Neal. As it seems, then, even the most
trivial attribution of reference to proper names may involve consideration of the speaker's beliefs
and intentions.
In his reply to Carston (2007), Recanati (2007) concedes the point and proposes a partial revision
of his previous position. The suggestion is that the degree of activation of mental contents may
change not only as a consequence of a new train of activation, but also as a consequence of a meta-
representational process, as when an “externalization of the explicature” – as Recanati calls it –
occurs. In practice, an accessibility shift would occur at the moment when the meaning provided by
primary pragmatic processes is embedded within the meta-representational schema “The speaker
says that ...”, in that Sarah (the speaker) is unconnected to Neil1 while she's got some connection to
Neil2.
What this proposal exactly implies with regard to the issue of associative processes is not very
clear to me. On the one hand, it seems that Recanati wants to extend his associative account to cases
involving consideration of the speaker's mind. For instance, this is how Recanati explains why the
meta-representational schema may produce an accessibility shift:
“That is because, owing to the connection between them in the knowledge base of
the interpreter, the concept of Sarah and the concept of Neil2  mutually reinforce
their activation, so that the winning interpretation at s' (the externalization stage) is
Sarah tells me that Neil2 has broken a leg” (Recanati, 2007: 2, his emphasis).
These lines make appeal to the dynamics of accessibility and activation argued for in Recanati
(2004). Also schemata appear to keep their explanatory role unchanged. Recanati (2007) takes into
consideration an objection to the effect that schemata are often conceived of as instances of general
world-knowledge, while Carston's example involves an instance of  particular  world-knowledge,
that  is,  Mary's  knowledge  that  Sarah  does  not  know  Neil1 while  she's  acquainted  with  Neil2.
Recanati dismisses the objection by simply saying that he does not believe (and he never claimed)
that  only  general  world-knowledge  can  trigger  accessibility  shifts;  on  the  contrary,  particular
world-knowledge could play exactly the same role. This seems to show that, according to Recanati,
his  explanation  based on schemata  and the  dynamics  of  accessibility  also  applies  to  Carston's
example.
On the other hand, it is worth considering how Recanati summarizes this revision of his previous
position. He does not say that, contrary to what he maintained in Recanati (2004), consideration of
the speaker's mind can be accounted for in subpersonal, associative terms. He rather says that some
meta-representational component may be involved even in primary pragmatic processes. In other
words, Recanati puts the emphasis on the necessity to occasionally supplement primary pragmatic
processes with a component  which is  presumably not reducible  to  them. Thus,  it  seems, meta-
representational  schemata  of  the  form  “The  speaker  says  that  ...”  are  not  taken  to  behave  as
schemata in Recanati's (2004) sense. In fact, there is a large literature where meta-representations
are assigned a key role in how we humans understand others as intentional agents, and in particular,
as communicative intentional agents. This mind-reading faculty – as it is called – is thought to
involve  a  personal  process,  rather  than  a  subpersonal,  associative  one.  Therefore,  Recanati  is
presumably  appealing  to  a  component  which  he  believes  to  go  beyond  mere  subpersonal,
associative processes.
Assuming that this is the case, I would like to suggest the opportunity to consider a different
possibility.  As  I  said,  I  do  not  claim that  personal  processes  do  not  have  any  role  to  play  in
pragmatic processing. My claim here is rather that these processes are presumably not required in
order to account for the aspects evidenced by Carston's (2007) example and by similar cases where
the speaker's knowledge is taken into consideration. First of all, I do not follow Recanati when he
concedes  that  Carston's objection obliges him to introduce any meta-representational device.  In
particular, I can see no reason why the particular world-knowledge at issue (that Sarah does not
know Neil1 while she's acquainted with Neil2) could not produce its effects independently from any
embedding of the primary meaning within the meta-representational  schema “The speaker  says
that  ...”.  Remember  that  for  the  contextualist  view  embraced  by  both  Recanati  and  Carston,
contextual information may affect the interpretation even if that information is not mandated by any
linguistic  item. Therefore,  it  is  not clear that we need reference to the speaker in some sort  of
propositional schema (such as “The speaker says that ...”) for information on the speaker to become
active. In practice, I suggest that speaking with Sarah could automatically trigger (in the standard
associative sense) Mary's knowledge about her, including information about the environment where
Mary usually  meets her,  the people associated to that environment or the like.  Incidentally, the
hypothesis that our concepts preserve information about the most typical situations where we meet
their referents has some support in the psychological literature. As Yeh and Barsalou (2006: 31)
have observed, our cognitive system greatly simplifies many tasks by organizing knowledge around
situations: for instance, in representing chairs it is useful for subjects to store information about
locations where they can be found. In general, Yeh and Barsalou propose that  concepts have a
situated nature: they are to be thought of as rich representations that may include a variety of events,
entities and environments associated with their referents. Analogously, we may well assume that our
representation  of  specific  people  (Mary's  representation  of  Sarah,  in  the  example)  preserves
information  about  related  environments,  events  and  entities  –  including  other  people  they  are
connected to (Neil2, in the example).
In  sum,  as  far  as  I  can  tell,  not  only  can  the  representation  of  particular  contingencies  be
expected to produce accessibility shift exactly as general contingencies do, but also it seems rather
ad hoc to assume that particular contingencies about the speaker need to produce this effect by way
of a wholly different process. It is not plausible that information on people, their behavior, habits,
and so on, is wholly subtracted to the dynamics of association-and-activation. Therefore, we should
take into serious consideration how this dynamics can contribute to an explanation of pragmatic
phenomena, including our expectations about the speaker.
7. Conclusions
As even relevance theorists admit, associative mechanisms must be at least part of an overall
account  of  pragmatic  phenomena  if  pragmatics  intends  to  stay  in  contact  with  current
psycholinguistic research – and I would add, with neurobiological and computational research as
well. In this paper I have tried to show that, far from merely feeding pragmatic inferential processes
of the kind envisaged by RT, associative processes might rather mimick these processes: associative
relations have enough structure to deliver the inferential effects which are exploited in reflective
inferencing and made explicit in pragmatics by way of post hoc reconstructions.
A key to the understanding of this associative structure is the notion of schema employed by
Recanati in order to explain how associative processes can be constrained and driven by general
information without the intervention of any personal process. Schemata permit to bind together
different pieces of information in the utterance and the situation, discarding utterance interpretations
which lacks coherence. Here I proposed a generalization of the notion of schema, on the basis of the
consideration that associative relations are not devoid of information about the way in which their
terms are related: on the contrary, associations preserve information about the spatial, temporal,
causal etc. relations between their constituents.
As a consequence, the dynamics of association-and-activation is able to explain a number of
phenomena without appealing to specialized cognitive processes, as it has been done in some cases.
We have made the example of  syntactic  and other  linguistic  phenomena (in  the strict  sense of
“linguistic”), and also of pragmatic phenomena concerning the consideration of speaker's beliefs.
Although I  am well  aware that  further  research  has  to  be  done in  assessing the  merits  and
limitations of associative approaches in pragmatics, I believe that these approaches have a strong
point in their connection with the best established explanation of how we detect, store and exploit
information by way of automatic processes.
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